

**Transportation Security:
A Key Component of Homeland Defense [26Nov01]**

Minutes prepared by Greg Moore with the help of fellow rapporteurs Michael Opheim and Marty Wayne, and based on the proceedings of a workshop held on October 30, 2001 at the Denver Country Club under the auspices of the Denver Council on Foreign Relations and the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies and Center for Intermodal Transportation.

This is the fourth in a series of meetings on homeland defense. Many of the participants in today's meeting have been a part of the proceedings of the past meetings. In reading the report issued earlier this year in May, it is uncanny how many of the issues discussed in the previous meetings as threats have now become painfully apparent in light of the events of September 11, 2001. The 911 events have made the importance of this subject all the more apparent.

Transportation security is a component of homeland defense that has been talked about even less than homeland defense itself, and yet again in light of the events of September 11, it too has now become a key component of the overall security strategy of the United States. Transportation security is the all-encompassing term for the study of the defense of all modes of transportation, including land, sea, air, as well as the connecting modes and terminals.

Transportation is a key factor in the U.S. economy. With the September 11 attacks on the United States, the transportation system of this country came to a screeching halt. The transportation system thus became a weapon, channel, and a target of terrorism all at the same time. The U.S. will suffer greatly if it cannot develop a safer system. Despite the fact that this problem had been building for some time, it was only within the last five years that attention was finally given to it. Although a special task force was set up three years ago to address deficiencies in the system, the U.S. is still in the midst of playing catch up.

Another speaker stated that the goal of this conference was to become more local. Such a focus provides an additional source to international and national level expertise. Continental defense has been a hallmark of concern from 1945 to the present. One example is the national fallout shelter in the 1960's under President Kennedy. A second case in point was the Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars" system articulated by President Reagan in 1983. The overall message was that an overly confident attitude is misplaced.

There are a number of differences between today's meeting and those prior to 911. The first is that many of the things discussed in past meetings have now been implemented as a result of 911. The second is that the United States now finds itself in a state of total war for the first time since 1941. A third critical difference is that in the three previous workshops, homeland defense was relegated to the role of poor stepchild to international security. Now it is at the forefront, as witnessed by the appointment of former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to head up an office devoted solely to homeland defense.

Today's proceedings will consist of two working groups that will break up and then reconvene to report on their findings, one focusing on security in land and sea transportation, and one on civil aviation security.

Civil Aviation Security

There are two classes of issues in civil aviation security. The first is a general class revolving around situation assessment issues. Simply put, it involves asking where the potential targets lie. The second class of issues are more specific, concerned with what we might do about the situation we have defined. In addition, there are three perspectives, or ways to categorize what we can do about the situation once it has been defined. The first is state and local inputs to federal activities. A second way is the examination of state and local perspectives on state and local issues. Finally, one could examine a perspective on the coordination of activities between the federal, state and local governments. How do we view the problem as a whole? . Today's civil aviation working group will focus more so on the views and roles of state and local authorities here in Colorado.

A participant in the defense industry said his industry is inherently outward looking and has been prevented from looking inward by constitutional issues. But now things have changed as the line between “inside” and “outside” have been blurred by 911.

In a recent radio talk-show, airport security experts discussed how easy it would be to drive around the perimeter of DIA, so much so that one could even use a deer rifle to take shots at incoming and outgoing aircraft. Another issue is the fact that it is easy to access aircraft if one impersonates maintenance, food service or airline personnel. Moreover, there is no control over what these persons take on and off the plane.

There are so many possible threat scenarios. A need exists for defense in depth. An important part of defense is to choose priorities – the greatest dangers and vulnerabilities. This is the place to start.

A new aspect of the post-911 world is the realization of the importance of the non-state actor threat. It makes response much more difficult than in the past.

In our last meeting we discussed Washington and New York as the most likely targets, even discussing a scenario in which a plane is hijacked and crashed into a high-value target. Yet participants didn’t take it seriously – it seemed too fanciful. Another participant said this scenario had been discussed for forty years, but the supposed target had always been a nuclear reactor. A terrorist assault on buildings was simply not envisioned.

Another participant suggested we look at the mind of the criminal as a subject of study. The psychological component is one that has been relatively neglected by security and law enforcement officials, he said. We should try and think of things they might think of – ways to bring harm to people in an open society. We should think about what goes into and out of an aircraft – this is a source of vulnerability. The participant said some of the most brilliant people he’s ever met were on death row. The sophistication of the 911 attacks illustrate that Americans cannot underestimate the minds of these criminals.

A participant notes how relaxed security has been in the United States, perhaps even more relaxed than abroad. The different levels of screening in airports have proven to be a problem. While measures to protect against the “lone wolf” type of incident are laudable, steps to protect against foreign foes have been inadequate. Now we see the need to make some changes. But the security we need now brings a much higher cost to travel for everyone, in terms of time spent at the airport, and in terms of ticket costs. Are people really willing to pay the price? This could change the nature of flying – we may not fly to grandma’s for Thanksgiving now, because of the additional costs in terms of ticket prices and time waiting in lines at airports. Simply put, the system must be altered in a way that is compatible with the economics of the airline industry.

Another participant said his greatest fear was the notion of ten individuals with Stinger missiles outside ten airports simultaneously shooting down ten planes. This was do-able in his opinion. One could not rule out an attack by Stinger missiles due to easy proximate access to runways. Unlikely though this might seem, participants noted surprises in wars do occur. This raised the question of trying to defend against potential dangers Americans have not even started to identify. Local rules of engagement were a potential worry. Here in Denver and the Front Range perhaps the most likely targets would be the Federal Center, Buckley Air Force Base and NORAD. He wondered if local authorities have well-worked-out rules of engagement. The Feds do, but do we here? Another question is whether or not technology can protect us. If so, what would be the cost?

There is a new technology used on Air Force One that can throw off incoming heat-seeking Stinger missiles. The missiles follow heat sources, i.e., the engines. This device creates a heat diversion that will draw the missiles off target. This technology is now available for the commercial market.

A question raised is what an airport like DIA can do to protect its perimeters. Should the city of Denver buy up all the land around the airport? That might be possible now at DIA, but they’d have to move

quickly because communities often grow up quickly around the airport to service it. Buying up land to protect airport perimeters wouldn't be realistic for airports like La Guardia and Reagan National, which are surrounded by urban areas.

Another danger is that security doesn't really start until one gets past the check-in counters. What if someone carried a load of explosives into the airport and blew it up in the midst of the long lines? It would still kill many and shut down an airport.

El Al, the Israeli national airline, might be a model Americans should study, as they have had a very good record against terrorism and hijacking.

In trying to think "out of the box," one participant suggested we imagine baggage shipped unaccompanied as cargo on commercial airlines from Pakistan to LAX and transferred on to DIA. The United States needs a staging area for cargo in civil aviation just as it has in the port areas on the coasts for seaborne cargo shipments. A comparison was drawn to the drug war. Despite the best efforts of officials, drugs still reach this country, for while U.S. authorities are able to track flights and monitor boats coming into this country, they have not been able to stop the majority of drug shipments coming into the United States.

Talking about freedoms versus the need for security, there are things that can be done in the military community while abroad in war, that just can't be done in the context of homeland defense in the domestic context.

Profiling techniques were discussed, although many worried about the potential deleterious effects on rights and privileges. On the topic of racial profiling, a non-Caucasian participant said American law enforcement officials would be idiots not to give a higher level of scrutiny to Middle Eastern males in the US when we know that 19 of 19 persons involved in the suicide attacks of September 11 were Middle East males. He concluded that while Americans have to be careful not to threaten the rights of Middle Easterners in our country, they can't be foolish either.

Passengers, employees, baggage, and freight are four categories that need different kinds of attention and different strategies of scrutiny in civil aviation. Goods and personnel can breach the security regime in some of these categories more easily than in others, but the threat to aviation security was real no matter how it came about. Whatever framework is adopted, participants argued that other hubs would have to participate fully to make it viable, for a breach in one location had the potential to threaten all locations. Still, a question arose as to whether systemic solutions were needed or whether it was better to deal with security issues locally, creating local systems that meet local needs and could be implemented more quickly than a nationalized system. Many participants supported the notion that security should be improved from the bottom up, arguing that overall it is likely it will take two to three years to meet the threat at a national level.

Could there be a ballot initiative here in Denver that would give citizens the right to decide whether to tighten security at DIA? A recent poll in Denver showed that two out of three citizens said they would accept attendant costs to tighten security at DIA. Such a move would highlight the problems inherent in the debate over Federal versus local oversight, but these are already evident now. The people here could decide themselves to tighten security. Another participant asks if such measures would really solve problems if other US airports didn't have the same standards. Others say there are many areas, like customs staging zones at the airport that would include radiation checks that could still be employed on incoming baggage/freight, regardless of federal standards. One way the Feds could deal with security issues is to set standards that all airports/ports would have to meet by a given time.

One participant questions whether Denver, per se, has a threat that is different than other places in the US that would require a particular response/strategy. The point is that this is a national, federal issue. Even if Denver has a strong, tight system, if other US cities do not, the Denver system would not be secure. "You're only as strong as your weakest link." The first step is safety at home. It is a large, interconnected problem.

A suggestion is that frequent flyers can pay extra to have a special line at airports, wherein they would get higher levels of scrutiny and a special card with a thumb print, etc., such as the lunchtime speaker suggested. This could be in lieu of, or in addition to, the right to fly license. For those who never fly, they would not need to get one. For those who do fly, it may involve a cost of information, although it would not have to be more intrusive than an ordinary driver's license.

Another idea was to decentralize security at airports so each airline would have its own security system. And people might gladly pay for more efficient and effective security systems. Let the market solve the problem. There is a demand for security and efficiency. A reward should be established for baggage checkers who find something illegal. This would create a market-based incentive to hourly workers who are underpaid.

The relationship of the state and federal government will be a major factor in any solution. It is a critical issue whether DIA has local or federal oversight. Some say that what we do in Colorado is insignificant if it is not replicated elsewhere to reinforce it. It has to be done at the highest level – the national standard. Simply put, the ability to control a public good is part of a huge interlocking systemic problem. It must be solved from end to end.

The response is that federalizing security as opposed to letting United choose the security company at DIA, is not going to solve the problem of laxity. There should be incentives and punishments introduced into these security systems.

One major problem is that the senior airline at an airport controls security. If United Airlines, for example, does not wish to play along, then change will not occur. The federal government would have to do what others are unwilling or unwilling to do. Once again this raises the question of establishing a nationwide, credible defense system. Another participant argued that for the reasons that a local or state-controlled aviation security system was insufficient, so would a US system alone be insufficient if it allows the boarding of passengers and baggage on planes bound for US destinations that US standards would not. An international standard is needed.

A participant noted there are agents like smallpox that are easy to introduce that can kill millions of people within weeks after being introduced on an aircraft.

Concerns arose as to whether actions taken may be overreactions, merely exacerbating the situation. One participant noted that in times of war one must prepare for every eventuality. Moreover, since the borders of the American homeland are porous and future terrorist attacks seemed likely, a strong response at the present time was warranted. Another participant feared that the generation of paranoia is one of the most important aspects of terror attacks, however, and that the authorities must be very careful so as not to aid terrorists in their desire to incite panic among the American people. Participants agreed that over-reaction is a danger, but that we won't know for years whether we overreacted or not. The US Postal Service is now under fire for under-reacting when the anthrax cases first broke out.

A member of the proceedings recalled that in 1993 there was an article in *The Nation* which made the case that the danger to the United States was not nuclear but rather biological weapons of mass destruction. Few took it very seriously then. Desert Storm taught our adversaries that few if any can take the US on head-to-head in the traditional military sense. Asymmetrical warfare is the means of choice in the present era, as 911 so amply demonstrated.

A suggestion was made that airports should require picture ID at various points in the airport. A participant notes that Chicago's O'Hare airport required picture ID at three different points in the boarding process in his recent trip, whereas DIA required picture ID only upon check-in. This way we might prevent a scenario in which a person with a clean record buys the ticket and checks in, and his companion, with a known terrorist background, actually boards the plane with the boarding pass. Another participant said that might not get us far, as it is very easy to get a fake driver's license in any city in the US.

Another suggestion was to have the flight crew board before anyone else, and secure the crew behind doors that remain secure until all passengers have disembarked. This might virtually eliminate the threat of hijacking. The participant says that in his post-911 flights he felt he could have easily accessed the flight compartment. The airlines have still not taken pilot security seriously in his view.

Now that 911 has passed and passengers have a more vigilant, perhaps even vigilante attitude, it is much harder to hijack a plane. Therefore, cargo jets like those operated by FedEx and Emery become more likely targets if terrorists determine that airplanes are still the means of choice to attack.

Another issue not discussed so much in the media but raised at this workshop was small airports and small aircraft. Participants said these small airports have very little security and pilots don't even have to file flight plans. Presently, a small plane loaded with explosives could fly into the Denver Federal Center and there would be no way to stop it. Could Colorado pass a law requiring all planes of all sizes in Colorado to have to have transponders on them so they can be tracked? Others say these are federally regulated. Another says it would have to be Federal, since a small plane coming from Kansas would fly into Denver without a transponder and could do what it wanted unless the Feds required the transponders. Others responded that it would still be hard to stop such a plan, for while transponders would allow us to see where the aircraft was, we still might not be able to stop it from reaching its target, particularly as we consider small urban airports and the myriad potential targets around them.

There was a discussion of a microwave-guided landing and takeoff, which entails automatic preset takeoff and landing procedures. Others said there might be a way to interfere with it from the ground and reset it. A pilot participant says these systems go wrong and it's a scary scenario when they do. He preferred the cockpit door situation.

Another participant asked if there was a way to prevent a terrorist from bringing a gas agent on board an aircraft in their carry-on and gassing everyone onboard while the terrorist pretended to sleep under a blanket with a breathing apparatus in their nose. Because traditional hijackings become much more difficult after 911 if passengers believe they might die anyway and have nothing to lose by rising up against hijackers, hijackers now have to think of other ways to take over an aircraft. Security doors on the cockpit might also have to be gas-proof to protect against this sort of method.

Another problem is USAF or Air National Guard authorization to take down hijacked aircraft when people onboard the aircraft might be in the midst of trying to wrest control of the plane back from control of the terrorists. The USAF/ANG doesn't know what's going on in the aircraft and might shoot down a hijacked plane even as the passengers subdue the terrorists. Is there a way to prevent this?

The lunchtime speaker raised the notion of a national license to fly card, that would be necessary for everyone who chose to exercise their right to fly. So as to avoid the appearance of government imposition, it could be emphasized that the flying liking driving an automobile is a privilege not a right per se, and so anyone choosing to exercise their right to fly would be required to have one. Foreign nationals would be required to show valid passports to board planes, which would mean people without valid visas would not be able to fly (some of the 911 terrorists had overstayed their visas according to reports).

It would be helpful to agree on a definition of what a secure airport is.

Regarding new technologies for identification, a palm or thumbprint might be preferable to a retinal scan, as the latter are being questioned now as possibly being damaging to the retina.

Another suggestion is to do a serious study of how other governments have responded to threats like the Red Army, Aum Shimruko, etc. We have much to learn from other states in their counter-terror efforts. Someone said the Israelis are now offering consulting in this respect.

Surface Transportation Security: Water, Road, and Rail

Since 911 aviation security has been the overwhelming focus of public and governmental discourse. Surface transportation has rarely itself been a target for terrorist attack, but it is another important means by which terrorists and their tools move. American borders are highly permeable. A prime example is the movement of containers into and around the US. With heavy dependence upon rapid movement of goods in and around the country, including both containers and people, a tradeoff is being made between security and economic well-being.

This break-out group posed several questions to guide inquiry: How does this problem impact Colorado? What are State and Local perspectives of the Federal level? Should there be a reallocation of resources from the federal to local agencies? And how do we rectify public vs. private sector expectations?

Transportation assets have been used as improvised attack devices. Railroad security is a major and complex problem that has been focused primarily on fighting theft. Hazardous material (hereafter referred to as HazMat) placards on trains and trucks pose a complicated problem: they aid rescue workers in cleanup and extrication efforts but also increase the cargo's vulnerability to terrorist targeting. HazMat trucks are particularly vulnerable to deliberate spills.

Identifying the true vulnerabilities of surface transportation may be the best way to prevent exploitation or targeting by terrorists because in most cases, up until their attack, every action of terrorists is legal and does not attract attention. Attendees concurred that racial profiling must be avoided and better techniques of identifying potential suspects must be found.

The interface of the public and private sectors poses unique and difficult problems for transportation security. For example, should the north-south highway in Colorado, I25, be relocated further east for increased security? Most transportation assets are owned by the private sector, and the private sector understandably resists increasing financial burdens and responsibilities. There are also secondary considerations when changing transportation routes: businesses such as service stations and fast-food restaurants that depend on their locations near the major transportation thoroughfares will be left without a considerable portion of business unless they undergo costly relocations.

Highlighting local vulnerabilities, a participant noted that there is already a significant amount of hazardous materials present within the greater Denver area. For example, the Coors factory in Golden stores, uses, and transports a large amount of ammonium and chlorine. Moreover, this factory is fixed, thus presenting an increased vulnerability to attack.

Containers are transported from all parts of the world, and only 1% of these boxes are inspected. Authorities have no way of knowing what is in the other 99%, and so participants concluded that the laxity of this system presents a great opportunity for attack. This vulnerability is further complicated by the requirement of rapidity in the transport of goods within the current economy. The time, space and personnel needed for widespread inspection of containers are lacking at major terminals (such as the one near Detroit). The sheer volume of containers entering the country makes 100% inspection seem unrealistic. Similarly, what is the influence of trade agreements like NAFTA on US Security? Is the US inhibited from stringently inspecting containers if it interferes with trade?

Perhaps a pre-clearance process can be instituted where inspectors will be located far out on the supply chain. This system presents several vulnerabilities as well. Any documentation or seals could easily be forged by experts, as is the case with the current passport system. A better system could rely upon military imagery technology, yet this raises serious questions of unlawful surveillance and infringements upon civil liberties.

The Drug-War may provide some useful lessons: if a relatively good container inspection system is created, contraband may, in the future, be transported in personal vehicles. The Drug-War also shows that the government is not good at protecting US borders from contraband transport. In fact there may be no way to seal the borders from contraband bio-threats. Anthrax and Foot and Mouth Disease are prime concerns, along with briefcase-type nuclear weapons (for which there is currently poor intelligence), radiological threats, and even regular-sized nuclear weapons.

Perhaps there is some threshold of what can rationally be interdicted. Some threats we will not be able to control.

There is a need for clear goals of (Colorado) State interdiction efforts, along with a need for greater integration of State, Local, and Federal efforts. The local officers are more likely to encounter bio-threats or other terror tools in the process of investigating civil matters (such as traffic offenses and noise complaints). As one participant asked, "When is the last time a Federal policeman pulled you over and looked in your trunk?" Thus, Local and State officers should be trained to recognize threats to greater security. Hazardous materials are commonly transported on State highways, and when problems occur the responders are State and Local officials. Yet most of the initial anti-terrorist funding (\$10 billion) will go to Federal programs.

Participants also questioned whether national borders are the largest problem considering the ability to produce terror weapons internally.

Communication among State, Local, and Federal officials is improving, but still falls short. This failing produces a needless vulnerability to US transportation. Also, Western states, Colorado in particular, have a history of not wanting Federal interference in regional and local affairs. Yet when there is a serious problem these states demand help from Washington. This communication and values problem further complicates Colorado's anti-terrorism efforts.

Other levels that are not commonly discussed are university campus police and county sheriffs. What are the roles of these officials in local and state events?

Joint operations (among the military services) still have problems after 50 years of effort. For civilian applications such as the various types of police and other law enforcement agencies increased cooperation is possible and will substantially increase America's security capabilities.

A complication of increased cooperation is the difference between crisis-management and consequence-management. Crisis-management is directed by the FBI (as law enforcement) who secures the scene. Consequence-management is directed by FEMA and encompasses life, safety, restoration, and recovery. The events of 911 indicate a tremendous failure to pre-think the dangers of an aviation fuel fire in a steel structure. None of the first-responders could identify this threat, and many lost their lives. On the other hand a more successful example was the FAA decision to ground all flights within five minutes of the first attack on the World Trade Center.

Gubernatorial guidance is needed in Colorado to prioritize increased cooperation between state and local agencies. Despite a desire to meet, city and county officials in Colorado Springs have difficulty meeting in the same room at the same time. Gubernatorial influence would create an infrastructure of responsibility-prioritizing response organizations. Currently there is a unique moment in the socio-political climate for increased state-wide cooperation due to 911. Colorado has been a politically fragmented state by choice. Workshops with all parties at the table, coupled with providing money for already identified needs, would increase Colorado's security capabilities.

Colorado's emergency response depends upon volunteers. These individuals cannot absorb the increasing amount and complexity of training in their current capacity. In short, Colorado's response capability is declining in relation to increased threats. Urban areas are most prepared, and mutual-aid agreements may increase the preparedness for all areas. Mutual-aid agreements within the state and interstate (such as between Jefferson County and New York City) provide a strategic reserve of expertise and manpower.

Possible targets for terror attacks in Colorado include pumping stations and banks, and these are largely controlled by the private sector. Decisions to enhance security at these facilities are business decisions. Perhaps terror targets will not be in rural areas because the aim of attacks is to kill Americans en masse. Yet there is a clear need for thorough, systematic analysis of both targets and enabling devices. Particular attention should be paid both to the possibility of chemical attacks and the diversion of chemicals to inflict

mass casualties. Cross-country shipments of chemicals should be continued only with increased screening and security checks for HazMat drivers. Also, a tracking system for "Land Traffic Control" could be constructed to trace deviations in planned HazMat shipments. This proposal would likely encounter substantial industry opposition due to individual firms' desires to protect business secrets. Moreover, tracking dangerous chemicals may prove useless because individually harmless chemicals can be combined to produce hazardous substances. And a tracking system would require substantial human and financial resources to implement.

Other Colorado targets could include the Eisenhower Tunnel (the disastrous effect of a tunnel collapse was exhibited recently in Switzerland). In the current war, symbols of US military, economic, political, and cultural power have been attacked, but critical-infrastructure targets have not yet been attacked.

Cyber attacks may be another form of attack that could affect Colorado, given its strength in information technology and its role as a transportation hub. An effective cyber attack against critical transportation targets could be devastating. The USA has already seen attacks against aviation control. Cyber attacks could target computer/software functions, commerce and banking institutions, or shippers. While borders of time, distance, and space seem to break down in cyber-space, the real attack is in many ways psychological. To date there have only been three deaths from anthrax, yet there is considerable (and in some ways disproportionate) fear of this weapon.

Transportation in the United States is nearly completely dependent upon oil and its safe transportation. Energy security is at the heart of transportation security, and deserves intensive research, thought, discussion, and policy attention.

Plenary Session

- The present system of homeland defense is based on state actors. It needs to look at non-state actors more closely, as these are equally if not more important today.
- In trying to close gaps in security, what is a reasonable level of security?
- Authorities should consult criminals as a way of helping us think of ways to breach the system, that we might better understand the criminal mindset and find holes in the system.
- Also important is public education and the importance of confidence in government and a public psychology of self-protection and vigilance.
- In terms of local aviation, the participants looked not only at DIA, but also at Stapleton (cargo) and Centennial (smaller aircraft) Airports as well. This also should be the case in any Federal approach to airline security, because terrorists need not restrict their activities to large airports.
- At Centennial Airport, there is little flight control in terms of pilot-submitted flight plans (few submit flight plans according to pilot participants), and the flight times are often quite short, which means it is not so difficult for such planes to take off there and fly into targets in metropolitan Denver. In such cases there would be very little response time.
- Another vulnerability noted was Stinger-type missile attacks on landing and departing aircraft. The weaponry is widely available to Afghans and people elsewhere who have an axe to grind with the US.
- Passengers, employees, baggage, and freight are separate categories that must have specific strategies for security.
- Technology may be used to address some of the problems discussed, such as automatic transponders on all aircraft, a counter to Stingers, a secure cockpit, remote landing/take-off, etc.
- In terms of procedures, one possibility would be mandatory curbside check-ins for all baggage, so baggage could not even get into the airport without being screened.
- Another suggestion was staging areas for cargo at DIA
- ISO 99 standards were another idea
- Yet another was that the city of Denver should buy up land near the airport to protect against Stinger attacks.
- Participants agreed that the Flight ID card/license idea was a good one, and better than a national identity card.

- Lastly, some participants recommended that Colorado consider adding security factors that surpass federal standards and mandate them saying, if airlines want to fly into Colorado, they will have to abide by these standards.

Summary of land and sea transportation issues:

- Actors concerned with land and sea transportation are disparate – carriers, shippers, receivers, the state. All have to be in the loop for security purpose.
- Transportation security requires cooperation between the public and private sector, which leads to the question of who will pay for the necessary security.
- In discussions of transportation security, what happens upstream is important. The US security zone must extend outward to neighboring areas. Such is the case with Colorado – its security depends on what other states do. It is not possible to seal the borders of Colorado or of the US.
- The problem with coordination is significant. For example, in the case of roadways, as state troopers do not work on county roads, and county law enforcement do not have jurisdiction over state highways.
- Another problem is that while the state has training programs for emergency response, such is less likely to be the case as one goes down to county, city and town governments. Offering training and training volunteers at these lower levels is an important role the state can play.
- Moving beyond training, education plays an important role in defending against certain kinds of attacks. For instance, because of the recent anthrax scare, we now have a public much more aware of the anthrax issue. We still have many other agents/issues that they know nothing about.
- At a Federal level there is a need for federal grants for training at state and local level. The Department of Transportation is not working well to coordinate first responders. Public information programs need to be proactive rather than reactive. In recent weeks they have been more reactive.
- State governments should play a more significant role in emergency/terror issues at the local levels than they have. There is also a need for greater information sharing from local to state and to federal levels.
- Cyber-warfare against transportation systems is another issue that needs to be considered.

Final discussions

Colorado should have its own levels of security that are over and above the Federal levels

Education, standards, and technology solutions are three common themes between the two groups.

DIA is one of the top ten airports in the US in terms of flyer volume, so its setting its own standards might have a large impact on air traffic around the country.

It might be easier for Colorado to set such a standard than it would be in a larger state. DIA is run by the city of Denver, and so this is really an issue for the mayor and the city council to deal with, though a referendum might be needed.

As it regards security in Colorado, we have to think about smaller regional airports like Montrose. They would need to adopt these standards too if planes are flying from there into DIA.

If there are added costs for security that might inhibit visitors to a tourist center like Colorado, perhaps the added costs should be borne not only by DIA or the city of Denver, but by all those who benefit from an efficient air transport system in the tourism industry.

If we have higher standards at DIA than at other major airports, the biggest opponents will be the airlines that fly in and out of DIA. They have been the biggest opponents to higher federal standards.

Another respondent says that having the flight ID card we've discussed would not stop the 19 that hijacked the planes on 911. They were frequent flyers and would have the card anyway. However, with such a card their movements could be better screened. Another participant remarked that such cards could be subsidized by the airlines since they relate to market information.

If defenses at DIA are hardened, this is good, but we must consider the Colorado system of transportation as a whole. We must bring in CDOT. We must also remember that by strengthening DIA, one result may be that other targets may become more appealing. Some of these might be in Colorado as well, especially in the downtown metropolitan area.

How does NAFTA effect transportation security when we consider the greater laxity of standards with regards to Mexican trucks?

We need to discuss the differences between civil liberties and conveniences. Civil liberties are rights that we have in the constitution, etc. Having a bit of inconvenience in terms of longer lines at airports, is an issue of convenience, not really a civil liberties issue. This point hasn't been discussed enough.

In a discussion of national ID cards, many here favored them, saying that such cards might even be combined with the social security card and the voter ID number.